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KING'S GARDEN INC. v. FCC: LOOSENING
THE POLITICAL HANDS OF CAESAR
By Patricia Stern Green*
Introduction
Only a decade ago, the Warren Court handed down two decisions,
known collectively as the "prayer and Bible reading cases."1 Their
announcement was greeted with clamorous public hostility2 culminating
in the introduction of a number of constitutional amendments to reverse
the "lockout of God" by the congressional guardians of the public weal.3
The proposed amendments were finally defeated by a coalition of
liberal religious and lay organizations intent upon preserving -the First
Amendment guarantee of religious liberty, but not without a massive
counteroffensive directed at the Congress and its national constituency.4
So it is not without irony that a scant ten years later a case which
sought to test the constitutionality of the controversial amendment to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,5 which exempts all religious
corporations from -the national policy of nondiscrimination in employ-
ment, went unnoticed in the public press." Even more alarming is the
fact that the denial of certiorari in this case by the Supreme Court
evoked not even an indifferent protest among the groups traditionally
* Member, second year class.
1. School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962).
2. See Pollack, Forward: Public Prayers in Public Schools, The Supreme
Court, 1962 Term, 77 HAv. L. REv. 62, 63 (1963).
3. Twenty-two senators and fifty-three representatives introduced amendments in
response to Engel alone. Beaney & Beiser, Prayer and Politics: The Impact of Engel
and Schempp on the Political Process, in TE ImPACr OF SUPREmE CoURT DECIsioNs
20, 23 (T. Becker ed. 1969).
4. Note, Religion and the Public Schools, 20 VAND. L. Rv. 1078, 1087-88
(1967).
5. Equal Employment Opportunity Act § 3 (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000
e-1 (1964).
6. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct.
309 (1974).
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devoted to the preservation of the wall of separation between church
and state.
7
While the vagaries of public opinion and the political winds of
change are beyond the scope of this article, the purpose of the note
is first, to examine the instant case in detail; secondly to analyze the
peculiar events which led to -the litigation in the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia; thirdly, to assess -the state of the law for relig-
ious discrimination in other jurisdictions; and finally to point out that
by refusing to hear the appeal, -the Supreme Court has left the lower
courts in a quandary and the ambiguities of Title VII unresolved.
Background
On April 24, 1967, the Office of Communication, the Board of
Homeland Ministries and the Committee for Racial Justice Now of the
United Church of Christ8 filed a petition with the Federal Communica-
tions Commission seeking the adoption of the following broadcast rule:
No license shall be granted any station which engages in discrimi-
nation in employment practices on the basis of race, color, religion,
or national origin. Evidence of compliance with this section shall
be furnished with each application for a license and annually dur-
ing the term of each license upon prescribed forms.9
Because the petition suggested significant changes in its policy, the
Federal Communications Commission not only provided for the cus-
tomary filing of statements of support and opposition to the proposed
rulemaking, 10 but also consulted with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission and the Department of Justice. At the request of
the FCC's general counsel, Assistant Attorney General Stephen J.
7. Only the ACLU filed an amicus brief, see note 63 infra, while groups such
as the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai Brith, the General Conference of Seventh-
Day Adventists, and the American Jewish Congress were strangely silent.
8. The Office of Communication is an instrumentality of the United Church of
Christ, a Protestant denomination of two million members, authorized to conduct a min-
istry in mass media and provide technical and legal assistance to citizen's groups
throughout the nation in matters pertaining to access to the broadcast media. See, e.g.,
Office of Communication v. FCC, 465 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Office of Communi-
cation v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
9. Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrim-
ination in Their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766 (1968).
10. The FCC received some thirty-five statements from individuals and groups and
all but one supported the United Church's petition. The sole objection came from the
National Association of Broadcasters which professed sympathy for the proposal, but
took the position that Congress had delegated this function to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission under Title VII,
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Pollak of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department responded
with an advisory opinion to the effect that the proposed rulemaking
was well within the authority of the Commission and that ending dis-
crimination in employment was a "[n]ational policy of high priority".11
Further, wrote Pollak, since 80 percent of television and 10 to 12 per-
cent of the radio licensees were (or soon would be) subject to the non-
discrimination requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
both the EEOC and the Civil Rights Division of -the Justice Department
would welcome the FCC's proposed rule as an "added incentive toward
compliance by broadcast licensees with existing provisions of law."1
Armed with the United Church of Christ's petition and the assur-
ances of the Justice Department, in June of 1969 the FCC adopted
nondiscriminatory hiring regulations' 3 modeled after those prepared by
the Civil Service Commission for federal agencies.' 4  The provisions
were particularly adapted to the broadcasting industry and issued under
the authority of the FCC's own enabling statute,' 5 rather than the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
In May of the following year, after a series of revisions, the Com-
mission's equal employment opportunity rules took final form with pro-
visions extending nondiscriminatory hiring policies to women and those
with Spanish surnames. All stations having more than five full time
employees were within the statute's jurisdiction.'
At the same time the Commission amended its own rules to insure
a "positive continuing program."1  To prevent a lapse in equal em-
ployment opportunities once a new license had been granted or an ex-
isting license renewed, all broadcasters were required to submit annual
11. Letter from Stephen J. Pollak to Hon. Rosel H. Hyde, Chairman of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission, May 21, 1968, in 13 F.C.C.2d 766, app. A [here-
inafter cited as Pollak letter].
12. Pollak letter, supra note 11, at 777. At the time the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission had no enforcement powers. Not until 1972 did Congress pass
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Under Title VII, as thus amended, the EEOC
now has the power to issue judicially enforceable cease and desist orders. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II, 1972).
13. In re Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination
in Their Employment Practices, 18 F.C.C.2d 240 (1969).
14. Equal Employment Opportunity Agency Program, 5 C.F.R. 713.201 to .301
(1974).
15. The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154, 307-10 (1970).
16. In re Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrim-
ination in Their Employment Practices, 23 F.C.C.2d 430 (1970); as codified at 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.125(a), 73.301(a), 73.559(a), 73.680(a), 73.793(a) (1973).
17. Petition for Rulemaking to Require Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in
Their Employment Practices, 23 F.C.C.2d 430, 435 (1970).
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employment reports as evidence of good faith.' 8  The regulations in
the FCC's order were stringent, exceeding those set forth in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in scope and detail. 19 Once again, the source of
legitimacy for the new employment policies was the Communications
Act of 193420 and the justification was the "compelling need for exten-
sive reform of media employment practices to help reduce racial dis-
crimination and bring about progress in race relations."'" Although the
FCC did not intend the action to conflict with the efforts of agencies
specially created to enforce these policies, it nevertheless had an au-
thority of its own to follow and separate sanctions to employ in the event
of noncompliance:
It is also clear that we have an independent responsibility to effec-
tuate such a strong national policy in broadcasting, and that we need
not await a judgment of discrimination by some other forum or tri-
bunal ....
. . . The command of the Communications Act is to the
contrary, whatever the nature of the particular unresolved public
interest question. Therefore, while not every complaint of an
isolated action, even if substantial, will warrant deferring a renewal
or designating a renewal application for hearing, renewal will not be
appropriate where there is a pattern of substantial failure to accord
equal employment opportunities.22
Regulation Through Licensing-The Fairness Doctrine
A unique combination of legislative grace and judicial approval
over the last half century has equipped the FCC with expansive powers
to regulate the broadcast industry.2 3 Regulation, of course, is accom-
plished through licensing. Both the Communications Act of 193424 and
its predecessor, the Radio Act of 1927,8 delegated to the Commission
18. Id. at 436.
19. For example, section 1.612(c) was added to the FCC Rules to provide that
licensees place employment advertisements in the media which have "significant circula-
tion among minority-group people," cooperate with unions to develop minority represen-
tation, and ban intelligence tests or other selection techniques which discriminate against
minority groups. Id.
20. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
21. 23 F.C.C.2d at 430.
22. Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrim-
ination in Their Employment Practices, 18 F.C.C.2d 240, 241-242 (1969) (emphasis
added).
23. Section 303(r) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. (1970), gives the Com-
mission the broad authority to "[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such re-
strictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this chapter ....
24. § 303 (1) (1) (Supp. 1975).
25. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
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exclusive control over broadcast licensing because: "It quickly became
apparent that broadcast frequencies constituted a scarce source whose
use could be regulated and rationalized only by the Government. '26
The broad latitude of the Commission to grant, continue, and renew
broadcast licenses is primarily circumscribed by a determination of what
serves the "public interest, convenience and necessity. '2 7 From its own
plenary powers, Congress has not only provided the Commission with
ample statutory means to regulate the broadcasting industry, but has
levied few restrictions on implementation.28
To guide the FCC's administration of licensing, Congress has or-
dained the "fairness doctrine." First codified in 1959,29 this doctrine
has been expanded by the Commission on a case by case basis and now
includes not only equal airtime for opposing political candidates, but
also opportunities for reply to personal attacks, as well as rules relating
to political editorializing. 30 As noted by the Supreme Court in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,"' the fairness doctrine is an outgrowth
of the same premise which motivates government regulation of broad-
casting in the first place: the inherent physical limitations of the sys-
tem. Because not all those who apply for licenses will receive them,
it is incumbent upon those who do to operate as "trustees" of the pub-
lic's airwaves. Licensees are thus burdened with an enforceable obliga-
tion to provide diverse political, economic and social views for their lis-
teners. In the event the broadcaster fails to meet fairness doctrine
26. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969).
27. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a). This section states: "Subject to the provisions of this
section, the Commission shall determine, in the case of each application filed with it
.. . whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the grant-
ing of such application, and if the Commission, upon examination of such application
and upon consideration of such other matters as the Commission may officially notice,
shall find that public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served by the grant-
ing thereof, it shall grant such application."
28. For example, the FCC may not choose among license applicants in the basis
of political, economic or social views, see National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943); or take censorship action in the form of prior restraints on
specific program content, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
29. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, amending 47
U.S.C. § 315. The amendment requires a broadcasting station to afford equal air time
to all legally qualified candidates for any public office. It provides further that there
shall be no exceptions from the obligation to operate in the public interest and to afford
reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public im-
portance.
30. This note deals only with the fairness doctrine insofar as it pertains to the in-
stant case. For an excellent survey of the current status of the fairness doctrine and
its first amendment ramifications, see Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double
Standard For Electronic and Print Media, 26 HAsT. L. J. 659 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Barrow].
31. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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standards, the FCC under its congressional mandate may refuse to re-
new its license.
3 2
The First Amendment and Broadcast Licensees
In the federal courts, the fairness doctrine also legitimates the im-
position of restrictions on the free speech of broadcasters. 3  For both
the FCC and the courts, application of the fairness doctrine entails the
balancing of the First Amendment interests of the broadcast media with
what best serves the public interest:
A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitu-
tional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize
a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is
nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government
from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and
to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to pre-
sent those views and voices which are representative of his com-
munity and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from
the airwaves.3 4
In sum, while the First Amendment allows the broadcaster "signif-
icant journalistic discretion,"' 8 the right of the people to be fairly in-
formed is paramount.3 0 Within a legislatively imposed structure, the
FCC functions as the government's "overseer" of the nation's air-
waves" which broadcasters use as a "matter of privilege rather than of
right. 38  For example, the Commission may revoke the broadcasting
privilege by denying a station's license for racial and religious discrimi-
32. Id. at 389-390. See also Brandywine-Mainline Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d
16 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
33. Television Corp. v. FCC, 294 F.2d 730, 733-34 (D.C. Cir. 1961); McIntire
v. Win. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597, 599 (3rd Cir. 1945).
34. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
35. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
111 (1973).
36. Id. at 102. There are indications that the federal courts are beginning to re-
consider the fairness doctrine as a means of insuring First Amendment goals in broad-
casting. Judge Bazelon has pointed out that the fairness doctrine may also operate to
suppress the discussion of controversial issues: "[W]e are told today, by highly re-
spected members of the newspapei and broadcasting corps, that governmental regulation
of broadcasting has been more pernicious than any group of private censors." Brandy-
wine-Mainline Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
J., dissenting). But see Barrow, supra note 30, at 682. Professor Barrow argues con-
vincingly that the fairness doctrine (with improvements) should be retained because:
"In our representative democracy, the need of the people to knowv should continue to
be a right to know."
37. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117
(1973).
38. Television Corp. v. FCC, 294 F.2d 730, 733-34 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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nation in programming,39 or refuse to issue a license at all when the
applicant is attempting to monopolize and control the singularly avail-
able sources of news dissemination in a geographic area.4" For all
practical purposes, the commissioners of the FCC are the ultimate ar-
biters of who shall operate radio frequencies and television channels
and how airtime shall be allocated, subject only to congressional legisla-
tion and judicial review.4
The Controversy
Soon after the announcement of its new hiring policies for the
broadcasting industry, the Commission received its first allegation of re-
ligious discrimination on the part of King's Garden, Inc., owner of radio
stations KGDN-AM and KBIQ-FM in Edmonds, Washington. 42  In his
letter of July 19, 1971, Mr. Trygve Anderson contended that when
he applied for a job at the station as an announcer or newsman, he
was asked discriminatory questions which had no bearing on ability to
handle a job in broadcasting. He asked the FCC to order the stations
belonging to King's Garden to delete requests for religious preferences
and beliefs from their employment applications.43
39. Several months ago, the FCC denied the renewal applications of eight existing
educational television stations and declined to issue a construction permit for a ninth
station in Alabama because of a past history of racial discrimination in overall pro-
gramming practices. This action was taken despite a recent effort on the part of the
stations to recruit and hire minority applicants. The FCC stated: "A history of dis-
service during the license term of the magnitude disclosed by the evidence of record in
this proceeding makes it impossible for us to find that renewal would serve the public
interest, convenience and necessity." In re Application of Alabama Educ. Television
Comm'n, 32 P&F Radio Reg. 2d 539, 560 (1975).
40. Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 34-35 (D.C. Cir. 1950). The
FCC, however, must hold hearings if the applicant so requests, before suspending an op-
erator's license. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (m) (2) (1937). It is also possible for responsible rep-
resentatives of the listening public to contest the renewal of a broadcast license as inter-
venors or as petitioners in FCC proceedings. Office of Communication v. FCC, 425
F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1969); accord, In re Application of Storer Broadcasting Co.,
27 P&F Radio Reg. 2d 1469 (1973).
41. See, e.g., Office of Communication v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
The FCC suffered one of its few reversals at the hands of the same organization which
instigated the enactment of the FCC's nondiscriminatory hiring policies. See text ac-
companying note 8, supra.
42. King's Garden described itself as a "nonprofit, interdenominational religious
and charitable organization located in Seattle, Washington." Its basic goal is to "share
Christ world wide" through a series of ministries aimed primarily at youth. Among its
undertakings are King's Teen Clubs, King's Teen Miracle Ranch, King's Teen Valentine
Banquet, King's Elementary School and King's High School. It also operates a Senior
Citizen Community, supplies medicines to Christian missionaries around the world, and
publishes Christian literature. Brief for petitioner at 3, King's Garden Inc. v. FCC, 498
F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
43. Anderson stated he was asked, "Are you a Christian?", "Is- your spouse a
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In accordance with its practice, the Commission's Complaints and
Compliance Division forwarded a copy of Anderson's letter to King's
Garden and asked for an explanation." King's Garden replied with
a statement that 78 percent of Station KDGN's programming was in-
spirational" and that its format was primarily "good music" punctuated
by hourly airings of brief essays on moral and spiritual values. As a
christian religious organization with a "mission," it was necessary to in-
quire of prospective employees whether or not they shared the same
religious objectives.4 5 Furthermore, King's Garden denied that these
inquiries violated the Commission's rules and supported its position
with reference to (1) a provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 which stated that the act did not apply to religious organiza-
tions with respect to employment of persons to carry out their "religious
activities,"4 6 and (2) a provision exempting jobs for which religion was
a "bonafide occupational qualification.
' '4 7
Finding the explanation unacceptable, the FCC informed King's
Garden that as a licensee of the Commission it did not exist solely to
espouse a particular religious philosophy, but was required to make
time available for the presentation of other, including non-christian, re-
ligious views. 48  Following these guidelines, the FCC concluded that
all work performed by employees of station KGDN and KBIQ-FM
would not be "connected with the carrying on of their religious activi-
ties" as described in the statute. Therefore, jobs in nonregilious cate-
gories could be filled by qualified persons no matter what their religious
affiliation.49 However, since it was a case of first impression, no sanc-
tions were imposed. Instead, the station was to submit within 20 days
a statement of its future hiring practices and policies in accordance with
the Commission's rules. 0
Before the twenty day grace period for King's Garden had ex-
pired, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 was signed into
law. Among the amendments of Title VII of the act was one of the
very exemptions on which King's Garden had relied. But the effect
Christian?" and "Give a testimony." In re Complaint by Trygve I. Anderson, 34 F.C.C.
2d 937 (1972).
44. Id. at 937.
45. Id.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
48. 34 F.C.C.2d at 938. See also In re Young People's Association for the Prop-
agation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178, 185 (1938). A religious organization was not
granted a license when it proposed to make time available only to other religious groups
which espoused the same views. Held: "The granting of this application will not serve
public interest, convenience and necessity."
49. 34 F.C.C.2d at 938.
50. Id. at 938-39.
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of the new section 702 was to broaden the religious organization ex-
emption to cover all its pursuits by deleting the word "religious" before
the word "activities." 5' 1 The exemption was now tantamount to total
immunity from nondiscrimination in hiring for any and all groups who
could claim religious affiliation.
Pointing to the new amendment, the attorneys for King's Garden
dropped their claim under the "bonafide occupational qualification"
and asked the Commission to change its ruling to conform with section
702 of Title VII. Simultaneously, King's Garden joined the National
Religious Broadcasters in filing a petition for rulemaking with the FCC
demanding an amendment to sections 73.125 and 73.301 to exempt
all employees of religious radio stations to reflect the changes in the
Civil Rights Act of 1972.2 In its decision, the FCC declined to make
such amendments, giving as its reasons:
The Civil Rights Act and amendments to it are not part of our en-
abling statute, and the former does not encompass the whole of the
public interest standard imposed on us by the latter. This is ob-
vious from the fact that our rules differ from the requirements of
the Civil Rights Act. . . . In addition, when the rules were adop-
ted, we pointed out that the rules were based on the policy set out
in the Civil Rights Act and our requirement that broadcast stations
operate in the public interest. Our concept of the public interest
includes the duty of a broadcast station to serve the entire commu-
nity. "A refusal to hire Negroes or persons of any race or reli-
gion clearly raises a question of whether the licensee is making a
good faith effort to serve his entire public." Nondiscrimination in
Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C. 2nd 766, 770 (1968).13
There remained for consideration King's Garden's second conten-
tion that the existing Commission's rules as applied to it violated the
First Amendment. 4 It was argued that by assuming the responsibility
for delineating religious activities and defining religious philosophy, the
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970).
Prior to amendment the statute read: "'his title shall not apply to a religious corpora-
tion, association or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, associa-
tion, or society of its religious activities or to an educational institution with respect to
the employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities
of such institution." The statute now reads: 'This subchapter shall not apply... to
a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its ac-
tivities."
52. In re Request of Nat'1 Religious Broadcasters, Inc., 43 F.C.C.2d 451 (1973).
53. In re King's Garden, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d 339, 340 (1972).
54. Id. at 341. (King's Garden had cited two "conscientious objector" cases,
Welch v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965), for the principle that religion must not be limited to traditional or parochial
concepts.)
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FCC's restrictions interfered with its free exercise of religion. King's
Garden urged that the Commission recognize that all its broadcasting
operations were religious activities and therefore its hiring practices
were wholly permissible. 5
The Commission's Reply to the First Amendment Claims
To show interference with the free exercise clause, countered the
FCC, it was necessary for one to show a "coercive effect" of a statute
against him in the practice of his religion.5 6 "We note first," said the
FCC, "that King's Garden can practice its religion without holding a
broadcast license," and secondly, "we did not compel King's Garden
to become a licensee. '57  The Commission stated further that it had
never recognized the right of religious organizations holding broadcast
authorizations to use a station only for the propagation of its own reli-
gious views. If King's Garden was unwilling to devote a portion of its
broadcast time to meet community needs through the presentation of
other religious views, it could relinquish its license. Having exhausted
all its administrative remedies, King's Garden filed an appeal from the
FCC ruling in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit5 8
Issues Raised on Appeal
In its petition for review, King's Garden raised no new issues, but
simply restated the same two arguments it had presented in the FCC
hearings: (1) that in view of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended,
the FCC did not have authority to require religious radio stations to
employ persons who did not share the organization's religious beliefs
and (2) the FCC's requirements as applied to licensees contravened
the religious guarantees of the First Amendment.59
55. 38 F.C.C.2d at 341. In a subsequent ruling, the FCC stated that it would ex-
empt all employees hired for the preparation of programs espousing the licensee's reli-
gious views and those hired to answer religious questions on the air, but announcers,
as a general category, would not be exempt from the nondiscriminatory hiring rules, be-
cause there was no reason why an announcer had to be of a specific faith to introduce
a program, read the news or make a commercial announcement. In re Request of
Nat'l Religious Broadcasters, Inc., 43 F.C.C.2d 451, 452 (1973).
56. 38 F.C.C.2d at 341, citing School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223
(1963). The establishment clause on the other hand does not depend upon a showing
of compulsion, but is violated by laws which establish an official religion. Engel v. Vi-
tale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
57. 38 F.C.C.2d at 341.
58. Transferred on motion of the FCC to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit which has exclusive jurisdiction under section 402(b)
of 47 U.S.C. (1970).
59. Brief for Petitioner at 2, King's Garden InQ, v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (1974).
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Since there was no dispute over the facts, the Commission's brief
answered the charges by reiterating that its nondiscrimination rules
were reasonable exercise of its authority under the Communications
Act, and that it had not interferred with King's Garden's free exercise
of religion because the "question of hiring . . . is more a matter of
conduct than belief," and, as such, had less "constitutional protec-
tion."0 In explanation the FCC declared:
The Commission's Order does not make it unlawful to hold a reli-
gious belief or opinion, nor does it require King's Garden to em-
brace a belief or to say anything in conflict with its own religious
tenets. Since the prohibition of employment discrimination imposes
an important social duty on broadcast licenses and affects conduct
rather than beliefs, we believe it may be enforced against King's
Garden without breaching First Amendment rights.61
Amicus Curaie Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union
Together with the First Amendment sentinel of the broadcast in-
dustry, the United Church of Christ,12 the ACLU filed an amicus curiae
brief in behalf of the respondents. The ACLU spoke to the issue of
invidious discrimination on the basis of religion made possible by this
amendment of Title VII, 3 but counseled judicial restraint. Rather
than view the amendments to Title VII as preemptive, as urged by peti-
tioner, the ACLU suggested that the FCC's order and the Title VII
exemption be read together so as to compliment each other. The pro-
posed test was a practical one: "whether compliance with one pre-
cludes compliance with the other?""4 Applying this test to the present
case, the ACLU argued that the FCC regulations did not require
a practice outlawed by Title VII but merely went beyond it. Secondly,
the ACLU pointed out, "the religious exemption of Title VII was not
expanded to include licensees" already under the FCC's jurisdiction."5
60. Brief for Respondent at 24. See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-
04 (1961): "[L]egislative power over mere opinion is forbidden but it may reach peo-
ple's actions when they are found to be in violation of important social duties. . . even
when the actions are demanded by one's religion."
61. Brief for Respondent at 24.
62. See note 8, supra.
63. The ACLU argued that King's Garden's interest in the free exercise of religion
did not include "the right to have a staff that functions like a congregation . . .
[a result that] would be outrageous in the context of race or sex discrimination." Brief
for ACLU as Anzicus Curiae at 4, King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (1974).
64. Id. at 15.
65. Id. See also Powell v. United States Cartridge, 339 U.S. 497 (1950)
and Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays, 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972) (State statute upheld
since compliance with it does not prevent employer from complying with Title VII by
extending overtime to both sexes instead of only women).
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The ACLU concluded that since the legislative purpose of the
Title VII exemption as applied to religious radio stations was unclear
and judicial construction was lacking, the court of appeals should per-
mit the FCC's ruling to stand.
Decision in the Court of Appeals
Early in January of 1974, the case finally reached the court and
in May a decision came down affirming the Commission's ruling. Writ-
ing for the majority, Circuit Judge Skelly Wright upheld the FCC's reg-
ulatory scheme as "facially sound" while recognizing that its future ap-
plication would "require continuing judicial scrutiny." 6
Basic to the court's decision was its finding that "[tlhe 1972 ex-
emption [section 702] is of very doubtful constitutionality." '  More-
over, Congress had given no indication whatever that it wished to im-
pose the exemption upon the FCC. Indeed, a review of the legislative
history of section 702 had convinced the court that its Senate sponsors,
Allen and Ervin, were primarily concerned with exempting religious
educational institutions.68 Senator Ervin in particular feared for the
protestant sponsored colleges of his native North Carolina, when he
stated that unless his amendment was adopted, the EEOC in possession
of new "cease and desist" powers might require such a privately en-
dowed school to hire a "Mohammedan, agnostic, or atheist."69  He
added for emphasis:
I am not exaggerating when I say that this bill authorizes the Fed-
eral government to lay the political hands of Caesar upon the -things
that belong to God.70
While the senators' primary intention was to bar the infidel from
the christian temples of learning, their amendment was framed in
terms so broad that under a literal interpretation any endeavor of a re-
66. 498 F.2d at 54.
67. Id. at 53.
68. Senator Allen observed:
Under the provisions of the bill, there would be nothing to prevent an athe-
ist being forced upon a religious school to teach some subject other than the-
ology.
Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 844 (Nov.
1972)." Id. at 54 n.6.
69. Hearings on S-2515, Equal Employment Opportunity Aci of 1972, Before the
Subcomm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. at 848 (remarks of Sena-
tor Ervin). Ervin referred in particular to Davidson College which was affiliated with
the Southern Presbyterian Church and privately endowed. The College had a rule that
a full professor had to be a member of an Evangelical Christian Church, and as a former
member of Davidson's Board of Directors, Ervin saw nothing "immoral or illegal about
that." Id.
70. Id. at 849, cited in King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d at 54 n.6 (1974).
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ligious group would be exempt from nondiscriminatory hiring policies.
71
As the court of appeals pointed out:
If a religious sect should own and operate a trucking firm, a chain
of motels, a race track, a telephone company, a railroad, a fried
chicken franchise, or a professional football team, the enterprise
could limit employment to members of the sect without infringing
the Civil Rights Act.72
Colliding with the Establishment Clause
It was clear to the District of Columbia circuit court that in en-
acting the 1972 exemption under the aegis of the free exercise clause
permitting religious entrepreneurs to hire only their coreligionists,
Congress had placed itself on a "collision course with the Establish-
ment Clause. ' 73  The First Amendment pledge of absolute neutrality
in religious affairs had been compromised.7
4
To reach this conclusion, the court of appeals invoked the cumula-
tive criteria first compiled by Chief Justice Burger in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion ...finally, the statute must not foster "an
excessive government entanglement with religion. ' 75
Applying the above standards, the majority found no secular pur-
pose to be served by the "unbounded exemption." As for the primary
effect, the exemption invited religious groups alone to "impress a test
of faith on job categories, and indeed whole enterprises, having nothing
to do with the exercise of religion.7 6  Moreover, they could uncover
a few precedents for a preferential exemption which in its administra-
71. 498 F.2d at 54.
72. 498 F.2d at 54. The court discussed the possibility that the exemption might
be read narrowly thus exempting commercial enterprises of a religious sect from discrim-
inatory hiring policies, but dismissed the idea, since it was "precisely this categorization
which Congress [had] repudiated ... ." Id. n.7.
73. Id. at 55-56. The issue is not a novel one. The Supreme Court has long rec-
ognized the need to steer the treacherous course between the strictures of the establish-
ment clause and the "accommodations" of the free exercise clause. See, e.g., School Dis-
trict v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). In fact,
the two religious clauses may actually conflict. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-
221 (1972). See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
74. "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
75. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See also Committee for Pub. Educ. and Re-
ligious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771-72 (1973).
76. 498 F.2d at 55.
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tion would accomplish "a sure formula for concentrating and vastly ex-
tending the worldly influence of those religious sects having the wealth
and inclination to buy up pieces of the secular economy."' 1
The third prohibition of Lemon against "an excessive government
entanglement with religion," had also been breached by the wholesale
exemption on a sectarian basis alone. It amounted to a "religious ger-
rymander" 8 on the part of the legislature, since its consequence would
be "to shelter myriad activities which have not the slightest claim to
protection under the Free Exercise, Free Speech or Frce Press guaran-
tees."7
9
A Fifth Amendment Challenge
Although it was not raised in the pleadings, Judge Wright alluded
to a possible challenge on equal protection grounds under the Fifth
Amendment.8" To the extent that the nonreligious commercial enter-
prises of religious organizations competed with those of nonreligious
organizations, the federal government was forced to discriminate in-
versely between business rivals. Following the two-tier test employed
by the Supreme Court in reviewing legislative classifications under the
equal protection clause,8 ' it was Judge Wright's opinion that the exemp-
tion could not meet either measure:
The criterion of discrimination. . . not only lacks a rational con-
nection with any permissible legislative purpose, but is also inher-
ently suspect. Such invidious discrimination violates th1 equal pro-
tection of the laws guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.82
Scope of the Decision
In view of the broad constitutional issues canvassed by the major-
ity, their decision case as something of an anticlimax. They chose
to construe the statute "so as to avoid, rather than aggravate, constitu-
tional difficulties. 83  While it would be dangerous to inflate a con-
77. Id. at 55. In a footnote the court cited A. BALK, THE RELIGION BusINESS 8-
11 (1968); F. ROBERTSON, SHOULD CHURCHES BE TAXED? 139-70 (1968); and M. LAR-
SON & C. LOWELL, PRAISE THE LORD FOR TAX EXEMPTION, 193-246 (1969) as authority
for this dicta. Justice Douglas is also critical of laws which subsidize a number of
churches and church sponsored businesses. See generally Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 700 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
78. A description first used by Mr. Justice Harlan. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
79. 498 F.2d at 56.
80. Id. at 57.
81. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
82. 498 F.2d at 57.
83. Id. at 57. See also United States v. Thirty Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363,
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stitutionally doubtful statute into a "national policy" as urged by King's
Garden, a definitive resolution of the constitutionality of the religious
exemption of Title VII would have to await a case in which it was
"squarely raised."8
Instead, the court read the 1972 amendment as not intended by
Congress to abrogate the FCC's extensive antibias rules. To begin
with, the Commission's regulations were in full force at the time Con-
gress was debating the exemption for "all religious activities," and yet
the legislative history disclosed no reference to sectarian radio stations
as within the proposed coverage of the statute. Secondly, the FCC had
followed the public interest command of the Communications Act, and
therefore was justified in finding the 1972 amendment to Title VII ir-
relevant to its regulation of broadcast licensees.8 5
Notwithstanding their reluctance to brand the statute unconstitu-
tional, Judges Wright and Wyzanski gave short shrift to the petitioner's
claim that the Commission's fair employment rules interfered with the
sect's hierarchy, membership policy and administration.80 Disagree-
ments among church members as to policy and interdenominational dis-
putes over dogma are immune from governmental interference under
the free exercise clause,17 but a religious sect has no constitutional right
to "convert a licensed communications franchise into a church."88  Its
religious convictions will not absolve King's Garden from taking its ra-
dio franchise burdened with the same enforceable obligations that non-
368 (1971); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S.
17, 27 (1968); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953).
84. King's Garden has raised a constitutional issue. "Does this Federal Communi-
cations Commission requirement as applied to licensees who are religious organizations,
contravene the religious freedom guarantees of the First Amendment?" Brief for Peti-
tioner, at 2, King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (1974).
85. 498 F.2d at 58.
86. Brief for Petitioner at 9-10, King's Garden v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (1974).
87. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). In an action
brought by an ordained minister of the Salvation Army for its failure to promote her
and pay her the same salary as that received by male officers of the corps, the court
refused to interfere. Held: the applicable provisions of Title VII (as amended) forbid
regulation of the employment relationship between church and minister, at 560-61.
Prior to McClure, there was ample precedent under the free exercise and establishment
clauses to prevent legislative and judicial intervention in the ecclesiastical arguments
among churches and their parishioners. See Kreshick v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363
U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (courts will
not decide between competing churches). See also Presbyterian Church v. Mary Eliza-
beth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
88. 498 F.2d at 60. King's Garden claimed a religiously motivated desire to en-
gage in activities in conjunction with other persons of similar religious beliefs, even
though these activities are not all strictly "religious" in a narrow sense. (Included were
regularly scheduled prayer meetings). Brief for Petitioner at 25.
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religious broadcasters must observe.8 9
The court found Wisconsin v. Yoder,9" on which King's Garden
had relied so heavily in its brief, to be inapposite. As distinguished
from the Amish in Yoder, King's Garden did not face an unhappy
choice of abandoning its traditional religious beliefs or risking criminal
prosecution.9 At most, its license would not be renewed if it contin-
ued to defy the FCC's ruling. Undoubtedly, there were First Amend-
ment limitations on the conditions which the FCC might impose,9 2 but
whatever the restrictions, they did not require the FCC to relinquish
its mandate so that religious sects "may merge their licensed franchises
completely into their ecclesiastical structures."93
There was more merit to the petitioner's complaint that the FCC's
exemption was too narrow to guarantee the denomination's right to
broadcast its choice of religious views. Despite the fact that broadcas-
ters' rights have never been clearly delineated, Judge Wright saw a re-
cent tendency of the Supreme Court to emphasize the same liberties
of expression for broadcasters as those enjoyed by private journalists.94
As a consequence, if King's Garden would be willing to meet its obli-
gations under the fairness doctrine by producing some programs of gen-
eral community interest, then it might well be able to give a "sectarian
tone or perspective to all of its other programming."9 So far the fears
89. Accord, Hartford Communications Comm. v. FCC, 467 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir.
1972). For a discussion of the fairness doctrine, see text accompanying notes 24-40,
supra.
90. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
91. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court recognized a free exercise of right of the
Amish to withdraw their children from the public schools at the secondary level because,
"the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to
perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs." Id.
at 218.
92. See New Jersey Lottery Comm'n v. United States, 491 F.2d 219 (3rd Cir.
1974). "We think it clear from 47 U.S.C. § 326 that in enacting the Communications
Act of 1934 Congress, while exercising its plenary power to license use of broadcast fre-
quencies, did not claim, directly or by implication, any power to impose conditions on
the grant of such licenses which would violate the first amendment." Id. at 224.
93. 498 F.2d at 60.
94. 47 U.S:C. § 326 (1970) provides: "[n]othing in this chapter shall be under-
stood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio com-
munications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition
shall be promulgated . .. which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means
of radio communication." In Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., the Supreme Court interpreted the statute to mean that "Congress intended to
permit private broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic freedoms consistent
with its public obligations." 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973). See also the concurring opinion
of Justice Stewart: "The First Amendment prohibits the Government from imposing
controls upon the press. Private broadcasters are surely part of the press." Id. at 133.
95. 498 F.2d at 60.
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of King's Garden were premature, however, since the Commission had
given no indication that it intended to monitor all programs emanating
from stations KBIQ-FM and KDGN in an effort to censor any religious
content.96 On the contrary, the Commission had ruled only that where
a job category at the station had no substantial connection with the es-
pousal of the licensee's religious views, it should not be exempt from
the FCC's nondiscriminatory hiring policies. 97  Under these circum-
stances, the FCC's directive would not compromise the licensee's free-
dom of religious expression and should stand.98 The majority closed
its opinion with an admonition to the FCC that it had set for itself the
difficult task of drawing lines between the secular and sectarian broad-
casting operations of religious licensees. Nonetheless, it was one which
the "First Amendment thrusts upon every public body which has deal-
ings with religious organizations." 99
Concurring Opinion
Unlike the majority, Chief Judge Bazelon frankly answered the
constitutional issue raised by the religious exemption of section 702.
He could not agree with his colleagues that the Commission's mandate
to act in the public interest empowered it to contravene an explicit con-
gressional policy.'00 However, the reasoning of the majority had con-
vinced him that in exempting "all 'activities' of any 'religious corpora-
tion, association, educational institution or society,"'' 1  Title VII vio-
lated the establishment clause of the first amendment. In his view, the
exemption was unconditional and not binding on the FCC.
96. To do so would contravene section 397 of the Radio-Communications Act, 47
U.S.C. §§ 301-97 (1970).
97. In re Request of Nat'l Religious Broadcasters, Inc., 43 F.C.C.2d 451, 452
(1973).
98. 498 F.2d at 61.
99. Id. at 61. The court relied upon Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Lib-
erty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 681
(1971); and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) to reach this conclusion.
100. 498 F.2d at 61. The sole precedent cited by Judge Bazelon was Southern
Steamship Co. v. Labor Board, 316 U.S. 31 (1942). In a five to four decision, the ma-
jority held that the National Labor Relations Board had acted beyond its authority when
it intervened on behalf of merchant seamen, because their strike activities on board a
merchant ship in a Houston dock was mutiny, a criminal offense within the admiralty
jurisdiction of the United States. See also City of Pittsburg v. Federal Power Comm'n,
237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956), in which Judge Bazelon delivered the court's opinion
that the Federal Power Commission could not determine illegalities under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970), because Congress had given that power to the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
101. 498 F.2d at 61.
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Discrimination by Other Ecclesiastical Employers
King's Garden is not the first case in which an ecclesiastical em-
ployer has used the free exercise clause as a shield for questionable
employment practices. But such advocates usually present a simplistic
argument which ignores the long recognized principle that although
government may not interfere with religious beliefs and opinions, it
may interfere with religious practices."0 2 In Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut,103 Mr. Justice Roberts drew a careful distinction when he wrote
that conduct dictated by religious belief "remains subject to regulation
for the protection of society."'
10 4
This principle was applied again a decade later in Mitchell v. Pil-
grim Holiness Church Corp. 5 The Seventh Circuit court upheld the
Fair Labor Standards Act' as taking precedence over the right of the
defendant religious corporation to practice its beliefs in a manner which
denied its employees the benefits of minimum wage laws and healthful
working conditions. Pilgrims Holiness Church maintained that its
printing plant, mail order office and bookstore was dedicated to spread-
ing the gospel and therefore involved religious worship rather than
commerce to be regulated by Congress. The court held to the con-
trary, reasoning that the act was designed to protect the welfare of all
employees and that doing the "work of the Lord" was not of itself a
sufficient reward. Pilgrim Holiness Church would have to abide by
the Fair Labor Standards Act because the free exercise of religion was
never intended as a guarantee of immunity for the violation of the
law.10 7
An even more novel free exercise claim was made in 1970 by the
new owners and operators of a convalescent home in Cap Santa Vue,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.'08 As employers, they refused
to bargain collectively with their employees, despite an NLRB order,
on the grounds that their religious convictions prevented them from do-
ing so in good faith as required by the Board. The employers claimed
that they did not believe in the commands of the National Labor Re-
lations Act or any other secular authority. In a unanimous decision,
the judges concluded that although the employers might believe as they
chose, this was an incidence of religious practice which the court might
102. See Reynolds v. United States, 9& U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
103. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
104. Id. at 304. Accord, United States v. Kueh, 288 F. Supp. 439, 443-44 (D.D.C.
1968).
105. 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1954).
106. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
107. 210 F.2d at 884.
108. 424 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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regulate, in view of the "compelling state interest" in the right of em-
ployees to self-organization. 109
So far the courts have been unwilling to extend the proposition
that religious conduct may be regulated in the interests of society to
the intrinsic concerns of the churches themselves, unless their religious
customs are contrary to the "criminal laws of the land."'10 In McClure
v. The Salvation Army,"' a consideration of section 702 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 compelled a conclusion that Congress did not intend
a religious organization to be exempted from liability for discriminating
against its employees on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin.
However, the court rejected the claim that the provisions of Title VII
were applicable to the relationship between the church and its minister.
To intrude in matters of strictly ecclesiastical interest would deprive
churches of the power to decide these questions free from state inter-
ference, and would represent an encroachment into the area of reli-
gious freedom forbidden by the free exercise clause.112
Religious Discrimination in Secular Employment
Although it receives less attention than racial prejudice, religious
discrimination in secular industries has long been a commonplace. The
cases most frequently litigated have involved petitioners whose religious
persuasions teach the observance of a sabbath other than the tradition-
ally recognized Sunday.
Following the compelling state interest test which the First
Amendment demands whenever the exercise of religious freedom con-
flicts with state laws,"' Supreme Court precedents have been mixed.
For example, in Braunfeld v. Brown," 4 the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of "Sunday closing laws" in Philadelphia, even though Jewish
merchants would be forced to keep their stores closed for two days in
order to observe their own Sabbath which fell on Saturday. Offered
as the justification was the state's legitimate interest in a uniform day
of rest for the protection of society." 5 Yet in Sherbert v. Verner,"
0
the Court ruled that the South Carolina statute requiring all recipients
of unemployment compensation to be "available for work" on Saturdays
109. Id. at 887.
110. United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 445 (D.D.C. 1968). See also note
87, supra.
111. 460 F.2d 553 (1972).
112. 460 F.2d at 561.
113. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972). See also Freund,
Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1680 (1969).
114. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
115. Id. at 603-14.
116. 374U.S. 398 (1963).
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was an unconstitutional disqualification of a Sabbatarian, since it dis-
criminated among religious convictions in a pluralistic society. The
Court found the petitioner's interest in the free exercise of her religion
to outweigh to any state interest in a standard work week."1 Sherbert
advances the proposition that a state may, and in some instances should,
act to accommodate its activity to further the religious interest protected
by the free exercise clause." 8
Reconciling these conflicting decisions has proven difficult for the
lower courts called upon to decide the issue of accommodation of reli-
gious beliefs in the private sector beyond the reach of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. A case in point is Dewey v. Reynolds Metals
Co." ' Therein, plaintiff Dewey, a new convert to the Faith Reformed
Church, averred that his religion not only forbade him to perform com-
pulsory Sunday overtime work but also to find a suitable replacement,
since all work on the Sabbath was sinful. When he was discharged for
his failure to abide by the union-management contract, Dewey embarked
on a monumental course of litigation to vindicate his rights.2 0
In a series of three decisions, the lower court ordered Dewey's re-
instatement.'' In its second decision, the district court held that in
failing to make reasonable efforts to accomodate the religious beliefs
of its employees, Reynolds Metals had unlawfully discriminated -against
Dewey by forcing him to choose between continued employment and
the tenets of his faith.121
117. Id. at 406-07.
118. See Note, Religion and the Public Schools, 20 VAD. L. Rlv. 1078 (1967). See
also Kauper, The Warren Court: Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations, 67
MIcH. L. REv. 269, 284-85 (1968-69).
119. 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd, 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.), rehear-
ing denied, 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S.
689 (1971).
120. Dewey filed a grievance protesting his discharge under the labor management
contract where his discharge was upheld. He enlisted the aid of the Michigan Civil
Rights Commission which refused to file a complaint for lack of probable cause. The
United States Office of Federal Contract Compliance denied a hearing. See generally
Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Ar!'itration under Title
VII, 69 MIcH. L. Ray. 599 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Edwards & Kaplan]. Finally,
on the basis of an investigation the EEOC found probable cause and Dewey brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. Dewey
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 291 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
121. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 291 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mich. 1968); Dewey
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969); Devey v. Reynolds Met-
als Co., 304 F. Supp. 1116 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
122. 300 F. Supp. at 712. The district court relied on Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) along with the 1967 EEOC guidelines although they were not in effect at
the time Dewey was discharged. The 1966 EEOC guidelines called for "an obligation
on the part of the employer to accommodate to the reasonable religious needs of employ-
ees." The 1967 guidelines provided for "an obligation on the part of the employer to
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The circuit court of appeals reversed the decision, finding Sher-
bert, on which the lower court had based its decision, inapplicable be-
cause no state action was involved. 2 ' Further, the majority decreed
that 1966 EEOC guidelines were in effect when Dewey was dis-
charged, and therefore were controlling. Contrary to the district court's
holding, the Sixth Circuit court absolved Reynolds of religious discrim-
ination, ruling that Dewey had 'been discharged for violation of his
union's collective bargaining agreement rather than for his unorthodox
religious practices.
On rehearing, the court of appeals stated that Title VII prohibits
only discrimination by design, not discrimination in effect, the compul-
sory overtime provision in the union contract discriminated "against no
one," as it was not intended to deny employment opportunities to any
religious sect.' 2 4 Lastly, the majority refused to reverse its decision in
the previous Dewey hearing wherein it held that when the parties agree
to arbitration, the decision of the arbitrator should be final.'
2 5
The New EEOC Criteria for Accommodation
With the advent of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972,126 the federal courts received a more definite statute to interpret
make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees... where such
accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business." EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. §
1605.1 (1970) (emphasis added). See also Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 118, at 608-
09 nn.43 & 44.
123. In dismissing Sherbert as involving state action and therefore inapposite to the
case at bar, the Sixth Circuit Court failed to point out that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was enacted under Congress' power "[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
states. . . ." At the time of the Dewey decision, section 701(b) of Title VII defined
the term employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
twenty-five or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks" so that it might have been possible to make a correlation between the "compel-
ling state interest of Sherbert and the EEOC's "undue hardship" standard. Cf. Edwards
& Kaplan, supra note 118, at 631-32.
124. 429 F.2d at 336.
125. Id. at 331. In his dissent, Judge Combs reasoned that Dewey's rights under
the contract and under Title VII were separate and distinct. The dissent anticipated
the Supreme Court's holding in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974),
in which the Court ruled that an employee has a statutory right to trial de novo under
Title VII and is not foreclosed by prior submission of his claim to final arbitration under
the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement. Accord, Hardison v.
TWA, 375 F. Supp. 877 (1974).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. 11, 1972) reads: "The term 'religion' includes all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demon-
strates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's ... religious ob-
servance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."
It codifies the 1967 EEOC guidelines.
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in cases of religious discrimination in employment. The new EEOC
standards for the reasonable accommodation by an employer of his em-
ployee's religious beliefs and practices were tested and affirmed by the
Fifth Circuit in Riley v. Bendix Corp.2 7  Riley, a seventh day ad-
ventist, was reinstated even though he was unwilling to work a Saturday
shift, and the company was warned to accommodate pluralistic religious
beliefs in the future.1""
In another seventh day adventist case, Reid v. Memphis Publish-
ing Co.129 the Sixth Circuit reconsidered the stand that it had taken sev-
eral years before in Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co.130 Once again the
decision of the district court was reversed, but this time with an order
to Reid's prospective employer, the Memphis Press Scimitar, to take
reasonable efforts to accommodate the religious beliefs of a sabbatar-
ian, if it could be done without undue hardship. 3'
The Reid case was distinguished from Dewey on three grounds:
(1) in Dewey, the employer had made an accommodation to Dewey's
Faith Reformed Church beliefs by allowing him to find a replacement.
(2) the new EEOC regulations were not in effect at the time of
Dewey's discharge, but were in effect when petitioner, Reid, applied
for a position as a copy reader with the Memphis Publishing Com-
pany; 3 2 (3) the decision in Dewey was largely influenced by the final
award of the grievance arbitrator, but no arbitration factor was presently
involved. 83
To reach their decision, -the three judge panel adopted Chief Jus-
tice Burger's "business necessity" test articulated in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.:
The Act [The 1964 civil rights Act] proscribes not only overt dis-
crimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discrimina-
tory in operation.... The touchstone is business necessity. If an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibi-
ted.13
4
Although Griggs referred to racial discrimination and the court's
current concern was with religious discrimination, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act treated them similarly. It was clear to the court
of appeals that the Griggs decision extended to other prohibited forms
of discrimination. Moreover, the Burger opinion had laid to rest any
127. 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972).
128. Id. at 1115.
129. 468 F.2d 346 (6thCir. 1972).
130. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
131. 468 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1972).
132. The EEOC guidelines were codified on March 24, 1972.
133. 468 F.2d at 349.
134. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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doubts of the Dewey majority as to -the constitutionality of the EEOC
guidelines or their consistency with statute. Thus, when the EEOC cri-
teria 3" and the holding in Griggs were taken together, the court of
appeals found a duty on the part of the publisher to accommodate the
religious needs of present as well as prospective employees.13 6
In the summer of 1974, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was
called upon to resolve a clash between a collective bargaining agree-
ment requiring all employees -to pay union dues, and the religious scru-
ples of Yott, a valued employee of North American Rockwell Corpora-
tion for twenty-two years prior to the union shop agreement.13 7  In de-
nying the appellants contention that his discharge for failure to join the
union was an infringement on his rights under the free exercise clause,
the court cited cases from the First3 8 and Fifth Circuits'3 9 as prece-
dent. The court found that on balance the government's interests in
"industrial peace and the free flow of commerce," which a union shop
insures, outweighed a minor impairment of religious freedom. 40 If
Yott could not in good conscience join the union, his alternative was
not destitution, but merely employment in a nonunion shop.' 4'
On the issue of "accommodation" as set forth in Title VII, the case
was remanded to the trial court for determination with the following
caveat:
We note, however, that it is not a "refusal to work" case in which
a reasonable accommodation is easily provided. We are not certain
that any accommodation is available. V appellees are able to dem-
onstrate -that any suggested accommodation would impose undue
hardship on the Union or on the employer's business then Yott's
discrimination claim should fail.' 42
The Ninth Circuit's repudiation of Yott's free exercise claim may
be distinguished from the previous cases involving religious holidays on
135. In amplification of § 701(j), EEOC Regulation § 1605.1 defines undue hard-
ship to the employer's business as a situation in which "the employee's needed work can-
not be performed by another employee of substantially similar qualifications during the
period of absence from the Sabbath observer." 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1974).
136. 468 F.2d at 351.
137. Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974).
138. Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 872 (1971).
139. Gray v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971).
140. 501 F.2d at 403-04.
141. See id. at 399. Upon his discharge by North American Rockwell, Yott had
secured employment with a calculator company that serviced North American Equip-
meat.
142. Id. at 403. (Currently on remand to Dist. Court for Central Dist. Cal. No.
71-1418 (Carr, J.,)).
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the basis that the duty to accommodate the varying religious beliefs of
employees should not put an end to collective bargaining agreements.
This is particularly true when the resulting discrimination is insignifi-
cant in comparison to a strong governmental interest in a union shop.14
The Current Status of Religious Discrimination In Employment
From the foregoing survey of the status of religious discrimina-
tion cases both within and without church sponsored industries, it
seems safe to say that for secular employers at least, discrimination on
the basis of religion is no longer permissible. Under the "business
necessity" principle first announced in Griggs, the controlling factor in
employment must be the applicant's qualifications for a particular job,
so that "race, religion, nationality and sex become irrelevant."'144
As for the variety of religious discrimination practiced by sectar-
ian denominations who insist on hiring their own devout to perform
work of a nonreligious nature, there is still no effective deterrent.
What is lacking is a decision of the stature of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. to define the parameters of section 702 of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act. Unfortunately, the decision in King's Garden falls
short of the mark.
Conclusion
Any significance which might attach to the holding in King's Gar-
den, Inc. v. FCC-45 is obviously blunted by the majority's failure to set-
tie the constitutional issue raised by section 702 of Title VII.14 1 When
stripped of dicta, the decision is little more than an affirmation of the
FCC's own ruling that it would disregard the suspect amendment of
1972, because it was not a part of its enabling statute.
In upholding the Commission's regulatory scheme as facially
143. Id. See also Hardison v. Transworld Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Miss.
1974). The district judge found that a union always has a duty to protect its members
from unlawful discrimination. Nevertheless, its seniority system (which provided for
choice of days off for religious holidays on the basis of length of employment) did not
discriminate against its membership because "[i]t was coincidental that in the plaintiffs
case the seniority system acted to compound his problems in exercising his religion. He
did not have sufficient seniority in the building to which he was transferred to be able to
impose his choice of days off over those of other employees who had more seniority."
Id. at 883 (emphasis added).
144. 401 U.S. at 431.
145. 498 F.2d 51 (1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 309 (1974).
146. The majority characterized the religious exemption of Title VII as a "poor can-
didate" for salvage by judicial construction because it was reasonably clear to them that
it violated the establishment clause. However, since it was far less clear to the judges
how much or in what way the exemption should be narrowed to avoid First Amendment




sound, the D.C. Circuit has left the FCC with no yardstick ,by which
to measure the religious and nonreligious dimensions of King's Gar-
den's programming without becoming embroiled in questions of the va-
lidity of religious dogma, already established as beyond the competency
of any court.147  And yet, if the FCC does not attempt a determina-
tion of what is religiously inspired activity and what is not, King's Gar-
den can continue to staff its enterprises from among its faithful despite
the decision against it in the D.C. Circuit.
More importantly, in permitting the lower court's decision to stand,
the Supreme Court has failed to answer once and for all Judge
Bazelon's contention that in exempting all the activities of any re-
ligious association, educational institution, or society," Title VII as pres-
ently written violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment.
The debate continues -as to the amount of accommodation the free
exercise clause may permit before running afoul of the establishment
clause.148 But if the tension between the two clauses remains a dialetic
in search of synthesis, the Supreme Court has never overruled Justice
Black's interpretation of the First Amendment in Everson v. Board of
Education49 that the government may not prefer religion over the lack
of it. Yet as the King's Garden court has made quite clear in dicta,
the religious organization exemption of Title VII does exactly that. To
compound the irony, the baptist and presbyterian separationists who
triumphed over the anglican theocrats in the struggle over establish-
ment first in Virginia and later at the Constitutional Convention of
1787, are now among the most ardent lobbyists for congressional dis-
pensations to religious institutions.' 5 In securing the Title VII exemp-
tion which permits religious discrimination, the separationists have
come full circle, abandoning the religious equality ethic for which they
had struggled since colonial days. As a result, religion, or the lack of
it has become a political question once again.
147. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); United States v. Bal-
lard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d
1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
148. See note 74 supra. See also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). "We
repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitu-
tionally force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can con-
stitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-
believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God
as against those religions founded on different beliefs." Id. at 495.
149. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). For a variety of scholarly interpretation of the religious
clauses of the First Amendment, see Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and
Doctrinal Development, Part II, the Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REv. 513
(1968); Katz, Radiations from Church Tax Exemption, 1970 Sup. Cr. REv. 93; Kauper,
The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause: Back to Everson, 25 CASE WnsT.
Rns. L. REv. 107 (1974); P. KURLAND, REuG.ooN AND THE LAw (1962).
150. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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Professor Freund would remind the partisans of state-sanctioned
aid to churches and their manifold commercial enterprises that politi-
cal division on religious lines is one of the principal evils that the first
amendment sought to forestall." 151
It has been argued that the religious exemption of Title VII makes
only another small chip in the "blurred, indistinct and variable barrier"
which the wall of separation between church and state has become
in the 19707s.152 Nevertheless, proponents of this permissive point of
view would do well to recall Mr. Justice Clark's response to an earlier
remonstrance to the effect that school prayers were relatively minor en-
croachments on the First Amendment: "What is today a trickling
stream may all too soon become a raging torrent."'1 3 In -the ensuing
flood, the last vestiges of the once proud wall of separation are in dan-
ger of being swept away with the current.
151. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HA~v. L. REv. 1680, 1692 (1969).
152. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
153. School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
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